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Should the Niagara Region Chair Be Directly Elected? Executive Summary: 
 
Key Words: Local government; municipalities; regional government; Ontario; Greater London 
Authority; elections; soft powers; economic development; voter turnout; head of council; 
regional chair; mayor.  
 
This explores the merits of directly-elected heads of council versus appointed heads of council in 
Ontario’s upper-tier regional governments, and specifically, Niagara Region. A comparative 
literature review of academic papers and government publications was undertaken, principally by 
examining the local government reforms introduced by the Blair government in English 
municipalities, and namely, the creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the position 
of mayor of London. Based on the literature review, four separate theories were developed in 
favour of directly-elected heads of council: improved voter turnout; improved calibre of 
candidates standing for office; enhanced soft powers; and improved economic development 
efforts. Each theory was tested by speaking with elected officials and administrators from 
Niagara Region and other area Ontario upper-tier municipalities. Ultimately, this paper debunks 
the myth about the merits of directly-elected heads of council and the Blair government’s zeal 
for them. Based on the feedback provided, it was concluded that having a directly-elected 
Niagara Region chair would not improve local government and that the existing appointed 
system should be maintained.      
 
I would like to acknowledge Dr. Bill Irwin, for agreeing to serve as my supervisor, and for all his 
professional and insightful support to ensure this paper was completed.  
  
3 
 
 
 
Table of Contents: 
Section 1 
1A Introduction 5 
 
1B The British Context 7 
 
1C Research Methodology Explained 8 
 
Section 2 
2A Evaluation Theory 1 – A Directly-Elected Chair Position Will Improve Voter Turnout 9 
 
2B Evaluation Theory 2 –Direct-Election Will Attract Qualified Candidates 14 
 
2C Evaluation Theory 3 – A Directly-Elected Chair Has Greater Soft Powers 23 
 
2D General Comments about Soft Powers 28 
 
2E Support Staff and Media Relations 31 
 
2F Government Relations and Stakeholder Relations 33 
 
2G Theory 4 – A Directly-Elected Chair Will Improve Economic Development 
Opportunities 
36 
 
2H Research Participant Responses about Economic Development 39 
 
Section 3 
3A Concluding Analysis and Research Criticisms  42 
 
3B Concluding Analysis and Research Criticisms – Voter Turnout 43 
 
3C Concluding Analysis and Research Criticisms – Calibre of Candidates 43 
 
3D Concluding Analysis and Research Criticisms – Soft Powers 45 
 
3E Concluding Analysis and Research Criticisms – Economic Development 46 
 
3F Final Thoughts – Governance Structures 47 
 
Bibliography  49 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
 
List of Tables Provided: 
Table 1 Research Evaluation Theories  
Table 2 Voter Turnout Mayor of London (Greater London Authority)  
Table 3 Regional Government Voter Turnout  
Table 4 Regional Chair Municipal Representation 
Table 5 Previous Partisan Experience of Canadian Heads of Council (Currently Serving) 
Table 7 Regional Chairs’ Social Media Presence 
Table 8 Overall Research Responses (Select Responses) 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
 
Section 1A - Introduction: 
“An elected politician has political authority which an appointed official, no matter how 
powerful, lacks” (Howard and Sweeting, 2007). This paper seeks to further understand this quote 
by exploring whether or not the council appointed position of Niagara Region Chair should 
instead be directly elected by voters. In particular, an analysis is undertaken of the perceived 
benefits and drawbacks a head of council enjoys from having a directly-elected mandate from the 
voters.  
This research question is timely. It should be of interest to practitioners of Ontario’s 
upper-tier regional governments, which include: Durham, Halton, Niagara, Peel, Waterloo, and 
York, respectively. There continues to be ongoing debate about the election method used to 
choose heads of council for these six local governments. The debate has been initiated by 
politicians and members of the public.  
Currently, there are two methods used to select regional chairs: direct election or 
appointment by regional council. The selection process is evenly split among the upper-tier 
governments. In Durham, Halton and Waterloo, electors vote for candidates contesting the 
position of regional chair during annual local elections, similar to electing school board trustees, 
councillors and mayors. Durham Region is the latest municipality to make the switch to direct 
election. The first direct election for Durham Chair was held in 2014. Niagara, Peel and York 
appoint their chairs at the inaugural regional council meeting of each new council term. These 
candidates for chair are both nominated and voted on by sitting regional councillors. Whether 
directly elected or appointed, all regional chairs serve a renewable four-year term.  
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Beyond discussions held around council chambers, in the general public, and in the 
media, the debate surrounding the regional chair selection process has also been taken up by the 
Ontario Legislature. Some Members of Provincial Parliament (MPP) have introduced private 
members’ legislation to bring about reforms. In 2010, MPP David Caplan initiated a private 
members’ bill (PMB) that would have had made all regional heads of council directly elected 
without requiring local consent.1  
Newmarket-Aurora MPP Charles Ballard recently brought forward legislation to amend 
the Municipal Act to introduce a directly-elected chair for York Region. This PMB had bi-
partisan support from all three recognized parties. Although, in 2016, York Region Council 
voted against a Council initiated effort to adopt the direct-election selection process, it remains 
uncertain if the province’s Legislature will override the directive of a regional council decision, 
and pass MPP Ballard’s PMB.  
A leading rational by proponents who favour switching to direct election is that it is more 
democratic than the appointment process. Ajax Mayor and Durham Regional Councillor, Steve 
Parish, has said “It comes down to basic principles of democracy.”2 Pelham Mayor and Niagara 
Regional Councillor, Dave Augustyn, is quoted saying “We need to move to a more democratic 
system in Niagara for electing the top leadership role.”3 Brampton Mayor and Peel Councillor, 
Linda Jeffrey, said during her 2014 inaugural address to Peel Council that “Today we chose a 
Chair for the Region of Peel through a process that I believe is flawed. I look to all of my council 
                                                          
1   Accessed from: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&Intranet=&BillID=2294  
2   Elected chairs risk politicizing GTA regional councils, critics say: The Toronto Star, published January 20, 2014: 
http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2014/01/20/elected_chairs_risk_politicizing_gta_regional_councils_critics_say.ht
ml  
3   Pelham mayor wants regional chair elected by the public: St. Catharines Standard, published December 26, 2014: 
http://www.stcatharinesstandard.ca/2014/12/23/pelham-mayor-wants-regional-chair-elected-by-public  
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colleagues to consider a more transparent and accountable method of choosing the chair for the 
2018 term.” 
Section 1B - The British Context: 
Academic literature exploring the issue of directly-elected heads of council in Ontario is 
limited. However, there has been a tremendous amount of research published over the last 25 
years from the United Kingdom which has explored in-depth the topic of municipal 
administrative reform. The Blair government, elected in 1997, set off a frenzy of new proposals 
designed to modernize, strengthen and improve local government, as stated in the government’s 
Local Democracy and Political Leadership whitepaper (DETR, 1998). At the heart of the 
government’s efforts was the creation of directly-elected mayors, who the government believed, 
would be instrumental in improving the delivery of local public services (Game, 2003).   
The Blair government’s campaign manifesto resulted in the publication of a wealth of 
government position papers, along with think tank and scholarly publications, which have 
provided arguments both for and against the directly-elected mayor model. It should be noted 
that these local government reforms have also been endorsed by the subsequent Conservative-
Liberal Democratic coalition government. Reforming English local governments has bi-partisan 
support in Parliament.  
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting the parallels between the appointment 
process for selecting regional chairs and the council leader system commonly used in the United 
Kingdom, and the target of the Blair government’s reforms. Similar to the regional chair 
selection process in Niagara, Peel and York, the council-leader system involves members of an 
English municipal council electing a leader to serve in the top position.  Whether you are a 
mayor, chair, warden or council leader, you are the political head of a local government. 
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Although, the Ontario and English examples do not perfectly complement each other, the British 
reforms provide an important foundation to undertake research of this kind. 
Section 1C - Research Methodology Explained: 
The purpose of this research study is to answer the following question: Should the 
Niagara Region Chair be Directly Elected? From the literature review undertaken about the 
merits of directly-elected mandates for municipal heads of council, four separate evaluation 
theories were identified to help answer the abovementioned research question. These evaluation 
theories are identified in Table 1. 
Table 1. Research Evaluation Theories 
Research Question: Should the Niagara Region Chair Be Directly Elected? 
Evaluation Theories 
1. Yes, because a directly elected-chair will improve voter turnout. 
2. Yes, because a directly-elected chair position will attract more qualified candidates to 
run for the position. 
3. Yes, because a directly-elected chair will be empowered with greater soft powers. 
4. Yes because a directly-elected chair will improve local economic development prospects. 
 
These evaluation theories were used to develop the executive interview survey questions. 
Executive interviews were chosen as the suitable research methodology because they were used 
in the literature review of scholarly articles. Executive interviews allowed for research 
participants to share their attitudes and opinions about the issue.  
Participants were drawn from three separate research groups, drawn principally from 
Niagara Region and Ontario’s five other regional governments. They include: 1) upper and 
lower-tier municipal administrators; 2) Niagara regional councillors; and 3) current and former 
regional government chairs from other Ontario regional governments. Group 3 is notable 
because it includes heads of council who have gone through the transition of being an appointed 
regional chair to a directly-elected chair. Survey questionnaires were adjusted for each group. 
However, the questionnaires did follow the same themes from the four evaluation theories. 
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Participants were chosen, in large part, through an analysis of public comments made by 
participants in media publications and in Council documents (staff reports and meeting minutes). 
The interviews were an opportunity to further flesh out ideas and opinions already in public 
domain. 
Contact information for research participants was acquired by gathering public 
information from municipal websites and from other professional network sources. Interviews 
were principally conducted by telephone to better accommodate the schedules of participants and 
to help heighten participation. Research participants were sent two notification emails about 
participating in the research survey and two follow-up phone calls. Since some participants are 
currently employed practitioners in Ontario local government, interviews were conducted 
confidentially with no responses attributed to participants. This allowed for more forthcoming 
responses and also improved participation.      
Section 2A - Evaluation Theory 1 - A Directly-Elected Chair Position Will Improve Voter 
Turnout: 
The first theory I wish to explore is that a directly-elected chair position will improve 
voter turnout. This was the belief held by proponents of introducing directly-elected mayors into 
English municipalities. As Orr (2004) wrote “The aspiration was to introduce mayors who would 
transform the exercise of power at local level, improve dynamism in policy-making, increase the 
popularity of local government, improve its ability to extract resources from the centre and 
remedy the decline in local voter turnout.” Martin (2002) notes that “turnout for local elections in 
the UK are significantly lower than in most other European countries”. Weak voter turnout was a 
catalyst for the British government to bring about reforms and propel the position of directly-
elected mayors onto English municipalities. 
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Even before Tony Blair became prime minister, the Thatcher government explored 
opportunities to reform local government with a study by Member of Parliament (MP) Anne 
Widdicombe, who found that “participation” is a valuable part of elected local government. The 
New Local Government Network, a London-based policy think tank, argued that “directly 
elected mayors have huge potential to improve civic engagement” and that this would especially 
translate into higher voter turnout among young voters (New Local Government Network, 2010). 
According to the Blair government, democratic renewal (Game, 2003) would be ignited 
in large part because mayoral campaigns would heighten public interest and engagement, and 
improve participation in local elections (Orr, 2004). There was talk of re-igniting “enthusiasm” 
in local government (Rao, 2003). Elected mayors would “reinvigorate interest in local 
democracy, providing a high-profile electoral contest which would increase British local 
government’s notoriously poor turnout” (Sandford, 2004). This idea was echoed by the country’s 
Electoral Commission which reported that “visibility of elected representatives and institutions 
are key motivators to voting” (Sandford, 2004). The existing council-leader system was seen as 
too inward looking and provided “no basis for the development of community leadership (Game, 
2003).” 
In response to the Blair government’s push for directly-elected mayors, Rao (2003) asks 
“Will that greater visibility encourage people to vote as the government hopes?” Research 
participants were asked whether or not they believed voter turnout, and public engagement more 
generally, would improve. Despite the hopes of the Blair government it was generally believed 
that voter turnout and public engagement, more broadly, would remain the same.  
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One Niagara-area elected official reluctantly conceded “yes” when asked if voter turnout 
would increase but added that “a directly-elected chair would not improve public engagement” 
and that “burning issues are what heighten public engagement.” Another elected official said 
they “did not know if it would improve voter turnout”, while two other respondents simply 
replied “no” that voter turnout would not increase. One elected official was more adamant in 
their opposition to this notion responding “an increase in voter turnout is unproven” and that “we 
need to ask ourselves is it worth the risk and reward if we change the selection process but only 
see an increase of 10% voter turnout, for example?”  
One municipal administrator said that “regardless of the voter turnout you were given a 
mandate by the people.” Among some participants they said direct election, for all its drawbacks 
“is the way to go” and that there could be “increased turnout”. However, this idea was again 
countered by one person who said changing the system would result in “a lot of additional efforts 
for very little gain” and another participant who said “elected from the elected is still elected.” 
One regional councillor raised concerns over the first-past-the-post electoral model insisting that 
being elected chair, with less than 50% of the vote, is less democratic than the council 
appointment process which requires multiple voting ballots ensuring the final winner has 
achieved a majority of support.  
The ideas shared by research participants on this issue are in line with voter turnout data. 
Arguably, one way to measure if directly-elected heads of council races improve voter turnout is 
by reviewing official voter turnout results from election campaigns. This was the case with both 
English municipalities and Ontario regional governments. Despite the personal enthusiasm and 
ambitions of actors outside of local government, directly-elected mayors have only produced 
modest improvements in voter turnout. The English town of Middlesbrough became one of the 
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first municipality’s to switch from the council-leader position to a directly-elected mayor. In 
2002, Middlesbrough held its first campaign for mayor. The Electoral Commission found modest 
improvements in voter turnout saying that “While there is no doubt that turnout at this election 
was higher than under the most traditional ballot” (Orr, 2004).  
In 1999, the Blair government passed the Greater London Authority Act which created 
the Greater London Authority (GLA), to be run by a new directly-elected mayor. Like Ontario’s 
regional governments, the GLA is an upper-tier body which encompasses 32 area boroughs 
governed by separate lower-tier councils.  Since 2000, the GLA has had five campaigns for 
mayor. As Table 2 demonstrates, like Middlesbrough, the GLA has also produced modest voter 
turnout results, despite these first-ever elections for mayor. On average, voter turnout for the 
position of mayor has been 40%. Less than a majority of electors consistently choose not to vote. 
The 2008 and 2016 elections are outliers, where voter turnout reached highs of 45% 
participation.  
In both elections there were high profile races because of the candidates who put their 
names forward; in 2008, Conservative Party candidate Boris Johnson, a Member of Parliament 
(MP) and journalist with a celebrity cult-like following; and in 2016, the Labour Party’s Sadiq 
Khan, an MP and the first Muslim to be a serious contender to lead a major European 
municipality. This is noteworthy because in the second evaluation theory, which will be explored 
later, argues that direct elections would entice more “qualified” individuals, not career 
politicians, to stand for office.  
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Table 2. Voter Turnout – Mayor of London (Greater London Authority)4  
Election Year Voter Turnout 
2000 34.43% 
2004 36.95% 
2008 45.33% 
2012 38.1% 
2016 45.3% 
Average Voter Turnout: 40% 
 
Building on the Blair government’s arguments, we can assume that municipalities with 
directly-elected chairs have higher voter turnout because of more competitive races which would 
result in far greater public interest and participation. Table 3 provides voter turnout for each of 
Ontario’s six regional municipalities from the two most recent elections held in 2014 and 2010. 
The voter turnout information provided was compiled from clerks’ offices and by conducting a 
scan of local media outlet online publications.   
Table 3. Regional Government Voter Turnout 
Region 2010 Election 
Result 
2014 Election Result 
Durham* 37% 31% 
Halton* 34% 34% 
Niagara 42% 41% 
Peel 37% 35% 
Waterloo* 34% 35% 
York 40% 38% 
*Indicates regional governments with directly-elected regional chairs.  
Note: Durham had an appointed chair in 2010. 
 
A review of voter turnout in the most recent two elections suggests that having a directly-
elected chair does not “re-invigorate” the democratic process, as the Blair government had 
hoped. A former regional chair who was appointed and then subsequently elected to their post 
said “voter turnout did not change” during the first election cycle in which they had to run 
region-wide for the position. Across the board results demonstrate dismal voter turnout. In 2010, 
                                                          
4 Voter information was compiled from the website London Elects: https://www.londonelects.org.uk/  
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the two regional municipalities with the highest voter turnout were Niagara (42%) and York 
(40%), both of which appoint their regional chairs. Interestingly, both Halton and Waterloo had 
the lowest voter turnout of the six regional governments with (34%), respectively. Both of these 
municipalities have directly-elected chairs.  
Arguably the most telling figure is the drop of six percentage points for Durham Region 
from the 2010 election (37%) to the 2014 election (31%). Based on the Blair government’s 
assumptions, we should have seen far greater turnout because now the contest for Durham’s head 
of council was a more “public, engaged and connected campaign”. Clearly this has not 
happened. Once again, the two municipalities with the highest voter turnout are Niagara (41%) 
and York Region (38%), while the two lowest ones are Halton (34%) and Durham (31%); again, 
two regional governments with directly-elected chairs. 
In 2010, there was an even split between regional governments that appointed their heads 
of council and those who directly-elected theirs. Voter turnout was 33% among directly-elected 
regional governments and 38% among appointed governments. It should also be noted that in 
2010, Halton Chair Gary Carr was acclaimed in his re-election campaign. This further 
undermines those proponents who believe that popular elections for heads of council positions 
would increase voter turnout.  
Section 2B – Evaluation Theory 2 – Direct Election Will Attract Qualified Candidates: 
As Sandford (2004) notes, one of the goals of having directly-elected heads of council in 
England would be to “stimulate greater interest in local politics through the prospect of a high-
profile local politician and a more visible electoral contest, hence raising turnout” and that the 
new process “would attract candidates of a higher caliber and different type, than current elected 
councillors, many of whom are disliked within central government for perceived incompetence.” 
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This idea is echoed by the a select committee report that found the Blair government’s push for 
directly-elected heads of council would encourage more people to pursue elected office (Game, 
2003).  
There appeared to be contempt on the part of the Blair government for “career 
politicians” who rose through the ranks of elected office to lead their municipalities. Rather the 
Blair government wanted to entice people from the private sector to seek public office. Clearly, 
the Blair government had become enamoured by the principles of New Public Management 
(NPM) and its call for more market-logic in shaping government policy.  To counter the 
appeared “problems” with these particular actors, Orr (2004) writes the government believed that 
reforming the system and introducing the mayor model would be led by “extraordinary figures” 
and furthermore, that they would be: 
“Superb negotiators, networkers, innovators and developers, with fantastic reflective and 
analytical capacities combined with excellent interpersonal skills. Conceptually this suggests 
their technocratic capacity to influence central government, to create space for the local, to 
set agendas. It evokes images of urbane technocrats dining with prime ministers: large 
figures, with large ideas, thinking large thoughts; as opposed to small people doing small 
things in small places.” 
 
Therefore, it was believe that introducing elections for mayors would achieve two goals: 
it would attract more people and more “qualified” candidates” and the election campaigns would 
heighten public engagement and increase voter turnout. In his analysis of directly-elected heads 
of council in German municipalities, it was found that mayors enjoyed political prestige from 
being chosen by the public (Wollmann, 2004). As we found with Evaluation Theory 1, voter 
turnout does not increase notably when looking at past election result data and research 
participants simply did not coalesce around the idea that a direct election for chair would 
improve turnout and voter engagement in the Niagara Region.   
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In response to Evaluation Theory 2, research participants were asked: “It’s possible that a 
directly-elected chair would have the largest elected mandate in Niagara Region. Do you believe 
an election campaign for Niagara Region Chair would interest more people to run for the 
position?” and “Do you believe an election campaign would attract more people, who don’t have 
experience in politics, to run for the position? For example, people with extensive careers in 
business.” A Durham Region staff report from 2010 found that the larger municipalities tend to 
attract more candidates per seat.  
Over and above what was shared, these particular questions led to serious concerns by 
respondents about parochialism undermining the ability for Niagara Regional government to 
represent the needs of all municipalities. Niagara Region is home to 12 lower-tier municipalities 
and covers a vast area geographically. There were concerns by both Niagara-area administrators 
and elected officials that “candidates from smaller communities would feel marginalized and 
intimidated because of the scope of the election.” One former regional chair said “big campaigns 
put smaller municipalities at a disadvantage” while another respondent said “the current system 
safeguards the small-large community divide”; and that “the voices of smaller municipalities are 
protected under the current appointment system.” Interestingly, these sentiments were echoed by 
a mayor from one of Niagara’s larger municipalities who said “it would be highly unlikely to 
ever see a chair directly-elected from a smaller municipality and that direct election would result 
in “90% of future regional heads of council coming from Niagara Falls, Welland and St. 
Catharines.”  
Another participant said “a directly-elected regional chair would make it harder for 
smaller municipalities to be represented and that “because of Niagara’s diverse economy 
(agriculture and tourism), the number of communities, and its population, the council 
17 
 
 
 
appointment process allows for the regional chair to be better positioned representing the 
Niagara Region as a whole.” One Niagara Region politician said that “under the current 
appointment process, the voices of smaller municipalities are protected.”  
Since the Region of Niagara was founded in 1970, there have been seven individuals 
serve as regional chair. As Table 4 notes, two individuals from Niagara-on-the-Lake, the 
Region’s tenth smallest municipality, have served as chair for 19 years. The longest serving 
chair, John E. Campbell, was from Lincoln, the sixth smallest of the 12 lower-tier municipalities. 
Debbie Zimmerman, the only female to serve as chair to date, was from Grimsby, the fifth 
smallest municipality. The two largest regional municipalities, St. Catharines and Niagara Falls, 
have both had three chairs appointed from their municipalities, serving a total of 17 years 
(following the conclusion of the 2014-2018 election). Ironically, one research participant said 
“the issue of making the switch to a directly-elected chair comes from the largest municipalities 
– advocated by elected officials from St. Catharines.” The current appointment system appears to 
have not hurt larger municipalities.   
When looking at the history of regional chair appointments, the results are mixed. 
Despite concerns of parochialism and smaller communities being left out, a chair has never been 
appointed from West Lincoln or Wainfleet; Niagara’s two smallest municipalities. However, 34 
years out of Niagara Region’s 46 year history have seen the appointment of a chair from a 
municipality with a population smaller than 25,000 residents. 
It should be noted that Waterloo Chair Ken Seiling and Durham Chair Roger Anderson 
both went from being appointed to directly-elected regional chairs. Chair Seiling is from the 
Township of Woolich, the fourth largest municipality in Waterloo Region. Based on the 
respondent feedback, we would have assumed that once Waterloo moved toward direct-election, 
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larger municipalities like Kitchener, the City of Waterloo and Cambridge, would have produced 
candidates who dominated the race for regional chair. That has not been the case. Chair Seiling 
has served as chair since 1985 and from 1997 onward he has won direct election for the position 
in six consecutive campaigns.  
Chair Anderson is from Ajax, Durham’s third largest municipality, and was originally 
appointed to this position in 1997. Again, based on respondent feedback, we could assume that 
Chair Anderson would have been more likely to face strong challengers for the appointment 
process from smaller Durham municipalities like Brock or Uxbridge. Furthermore, we could 
have assumed challengers from Oshawa or Whitby, Durham’s two largest municipalities, who 
have emerged during the 2014 election campaign. In both scenarios this did not happen and 
Chair Anderson continued to be re-elected.        
Table 4. Regional Chair Municipal Representation5  
Municipality Population Rank Number of Chairs Collective Years of 
Service 
St. Catharines 131,400 1 Peter Partington (2003-
2010) 
7 
Niagara Falls 82,997 2 Alan Caslin (2014-Present) 
Brian Merrett (1991-1997) 
Expected 10 
Welland 50,631 3 No Chair NA 
Fort Erie 29,960 4 No Chair  NA 
Grimsby 25,325 5 Debbie Zimmerman (1997-
2003) 
6 
Lincoln 22,487 6 John E. Campbell (1970-
1985) 
15 
Port Colborne 18,424 7 No Chair  NA 
Thorold 17,931 8 No Chair  NA 
Pelham 16,598 9 No Chair  NA 
Niagara-on-the-
Lake 
15,400 10 Gary Burroughs (2010-
2014) 
Wilbert Dick (1985-1991) 
19 
West Lincoln 13,837 11 No Chair  NA 
Wainfleet 6,356 12 No Chair  NA 
                                                          
5 Information compiled from Niagara Region’s website:  www.niagararegion.ca  
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There was also clear consensus by all three research groups that the actual campaign 
process for a directly-elected chair would be seen as a real problem. Respondents were generally 
concerned about the cost and campaign infrastructure needed to contest a race for Niagara 
Regional Chair. It was believed that two types of candidates would be attracted: those with links 
to political parties and “outsiders” from the business world. As one respondent said “most people 
would never have a chance at being elected” and that contrary to the Blair government’s 
insistence that more qualified people would be interested in standing for these heads of council 
positions, one respondent said “direct elections would exclude good candidates from putting 
their names forward.”  This same respondent added that “regional government is where political 
careers go to die so I can’t imagine someone being enticed to run for the position.” Another 
participant said “with direct election, you could elect an ineffective beauty contest politician. It 
happens all the time.” 
Respondents were in agreement that candidates for chair would “have to have the money 
to run for Chair because Niagara Region is a large area to cover.” One administrator said “the 
problem with direct election is that you have to now campaign over such a large area.” This was 
echoed by elected officials as well. One lower-tier mayor said “running region wide in a place 
like Niagara is just too big of a task to develop a profile,” while another lower-tier mayor said 
“Niagara Region is very large and this makes the election dynamic very challenging” adding that 
“the cost of running and funding a campaign would be a serious issue.”  
These sentiments were echoed by both sitting and former regional chairs who confirmed 
that “when you run for regional chair you need to raise a considerable amount of money” and 
that you need to create “multiple campaigns because residents in one lower-tier municipality 
could have different priorities from those living in another.” Some regional heads of council 
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even said that the provincial government needs to change the fundraising rules to allow for larger 
donations to be made because “the elected chair candidates are running in larger areas and in 
order to run an effective campaign contributions need to be higher so you can raise the money.” 
A Niagara-area politician said “the campaign for chair would exclude anyone without a high 
profile or access to six-figure sums of money.”  
One participant suggested it would be “an expensive campaign to run and that because of 
the large election period held for municipal campaigns candidates would need to raise nearly half 
a million dollars to compete.” Some respondents insisted that greater outside influence would 
come about. One respondent added that “if you have to rely on corporate donations to fundraise, 
you are actually taking away power of the people.” A regional councillor insisted that 
“campaigns would be fuelled by special interest groups.” One administrator said “if big business 
has a candidate there are risks to how regional government will operate and possible risks of 
parochialism”; this sentiment was shared by a regional councillor who was adamant that the 
campaign for chair would result in “serious concerns about outsiders buying the influence of 
local politicians.” 
Candidates for the directly-elected chair position would “attract individuals with deep 
connections to political parties” who would be better positioned to raise money, organize 
volunteers and oversee the entire management of the campaign. One administrator said the 
process could see “more political party influence in local government” and that “voting blocs 
could emerge on Council and this would be very dangerous”. Another respondent said “party 
politics would bring bad decision making to Council.” On multiple occasions there were 
concerns raised about partisan politics creeping into non-partisan local government as a result of 
changing the selection process. 
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One individual commented that “Niagara-area MPPs would use their position as a 
stepping stone to one day run for chair.” It should be noted that former Niagara Chair Peter 
Partington served as an MPP before being appointed the region’s head of council. Nonetheless, 
these points are very well taken when you consider the number of heads of council with prior 
partisan politics experience. As Table 5 notes, the heads of council for some of Canada’s largest 
municipalities all had previously been elected either to provincial or federal office, including:  
 
Table 5. Previous Partisan Experience of Canadian Heads of Council  
(Currently Serving) 
Name Municipality Partisan Elected Experience Prior to Becoming 
Head of Council 
Maurizio 
Bevilacqua 
Mayor of Vaughan Liberal MP and federal cabinet minister 
Gary Carr Halton Regional 
Chair 
Ontario PC MPP 
Liberal MP 
Dennis Coderre Mayor of Montreal Liberal MP and federal cabinet minister 
Bonnie Crombie Mayor of 
Mississauga 
Liberal MP 
Linda Jeffrey Mayor of 
Brampton 
Liberal MPP and provincial cabinet minister 
Gregor Robertson Mayor of 
Vancouver 
NDP Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) 
British Columbia 
Mike Savage Mayor of Halifax Liberal MP 
John Tory Mayor of Toronto MPP, Ontario PC Part Leader and 
Leader of the Official Opposition 
Jim Watson Mayor of Ottawa Liberal MPP and provincial cabinet minister 
   
During the 2014 election cycle, former MPPs Brad Clark and John O’Toole ran for 
mayor of Hamilton and Clarington, respectively. Other notable examples include former Ontario 
Deputy Premier George Smitherman who resigned from cabinet to run for mayor of Toronto in 
2010 and high-profile MP Olivia Chow resigned to run for that same position in 2014. Christy 
Clark ran and lost for the position of Mayor of Vancouver in 2005 following her tenure as 
Deputy Premier and a senior cabinet minister in the Campbell Government.  
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In defense of the Blair government, partisan politics has an extensive history in local 
government which is why the issue of partisan politics was not considered an inhibitor to the 
introduction of the mayor system. At the time of this writing, high-profile Labour Party MP, 
Andy Burham, a twice party leadership candidate, has since expressed interest in resigning his 
MP position to contest the position of Mayor of the Greater Manchester; the first election to be 
held for this position is to take place in 2017.       
Whereas the Blair government believed a directly-elected position would attract 
candidates from outside of government and from the world of business, and that this would 
improve local government as a whole, research participants saw “business outsiders” as a threat 
to good government. It should be noted that at the time of undertaking this research report, there 
continued to be widespread media coverage of Donald Trump’s campaign for president. This 
produced a “Trump factor” in the comments of some participants. Multiple participants 
specifically mentioned Donald Trump during their interview with one person concerned that with 
a directly elected position “we might end up with some big business owner who becomes the 
chair and has a separate agenda.” It is arguable that had this research been undertaken at a 
different time the reservations toward business-oriented candidates may have not been as 
negative.     
One elected official believed a directly-elected chair position would attract “retired, 
extremely wealthy and well-connected people”; that candidates need to “run for the right 
reasons; and those who run for office should “run on principles and do good for the community.” 
There was a general consensus that being an “outsider was a real problem” and that “someone 
needs experience in local government before putting their name forward to be chair.” One 
respondent said that under the direct-election system “someone could come out of nowhere”, 
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while another insisted that “we want people to put their names forward for chair who have local 
government experience.”  
One person replied that candidates “need at least general knowledge of how the region 
works.” Although, one elected official said “I definitely think more people would seek the 
position of chair if directly elected and that’s not a bad thing.” They also added that “you need to 
have the finesse that comes with running government” and that people from the private sector 
could be “impatient” adding that “we have to follow process and odds are when you’re 
appointed, you serve the council.” One individual said “you can’t run regional government 100% 
like a business.”  
Section 2C - Evaluation Theory 3 - A Directly-Elected Chair Has Greater Soft Powers: 
The third evaluation argument reviewed has to do with soft powers. Soft powers are not 
formal powers prescribed in legislation. Rather, they are additional authority that a head of 
council enjoys because they have a directly-elected mandate derived from the people. According 
to proponents of reforming the council leader system, these mayors would be better positioned to 
overcome legitimacy crises plaguing their appointed counterparts (Howard and Sweeting, 2007).  
Beyond the United Kingdom, Gladys Kammerer found that in the case of Florida 
municipalities, the “mayor’s role is significantly enlarged if he/she is directly elected” and that 
these political actors enjoy greater influence over council business than their appointed 
counterparts (Leach and Wilson 2004). Wilkstrom (1979) speaks of how direct election can 
improve the “status” and that it can improve a mayor’s ability to agenda set.  
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This sentiment was echoed by Durham Chair Roger Anderson when discussing whether 
or not Durham Region should proceed with changing its selection process: “It’s a totally 
different position once you become elected” and “whoever comes in and sits in that chair will 
have a pretty solid, strong mandate.”  A 1998 Durham Region staff report sought to explore how 
the election of a regional chair would “change the philosophy” of the office before proceeding 
with any reforms. 
These hopes and aspirations were also echoed by the New Zealand government 
whitepaper study on reforming the governance structure of Auckland, the country’s largest 
municipality. The Commission undertaking the reforms argued in favour of a directly-elected 
mayor, insisting that “a mayor, who is voted in on a platform of well-understood and well-
articulated principles has real visibility, a real mandate, and a proper basis on which to exercise 
power.”  It was further argued that direct-election would give “enormous legitimacy” to lead this 
new amalgamated super-municipality.  
The Blair government believed that their new mayors would be emboldened with soft 
powers because they had been legitimized by the public with their win (Sweeting, 2002); that 
they would provide clear public visibility and accountability (Howard and Sweeting, 2007).  This 
would allow them to improve local government and better coordinate public policy decisions and 
cross-cutting issues unlike the council leaders, who they believed were beholden to their 
colleagues on council who elected them (Elcock, 1996). This was echoed by the National Local 
Government Network (NLGN) which argued that “with a unique mandate, derived from their 
direct election across a locality, mayors can be better placed to lead an area rather than just the 
council (New Local Government Network, 2010).” 
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This coordination of policy priorities would also improve with local government 
administrators who would better understand council directives for the implementation of policy 
objectives (Fenwick, Elcock and McMillan, 2006). One government white paper raised concerns 
that locally-elected officials lacked profile and visibility (Stoker and Wolman, 1992) within their 
own communities and that there was a “leadership deficit”; these problems could be corrected, in 
part, by having directly-elected heads of Council (Orr, 2004).  
 Soft powers would allow directly-elected mayors to better negotiate with their council 
colleagues to pass legislation, be facilitative leaders who could more effectively build effective 
governing coalitions both on council and in the broader community (Sweeting, 2002). They 
would champion legislative initiatives that were part of a candidate’s election platform that won 
the support of the public. The elected mayor, who would be held accountable by the public to 
deliver on campaign promises, would be committed to seeing these ideas become law and be  a 
far more effective and decisive leader. Naheed Nenshi, mayor of Calgary, has said his public 
mandate has given him the “moral authority” to lead his council and set the policy direction 
(Warwick Commission, 2012). 
These public endorsements of a mayor’s election manifesto would “better focus” a 
council’s priorities to be more responsive to what the public wants, which could help improve 
the passage of legislation. Steve Bullock, who was the first directly-elected mayor of the London 
Borough of Lewisham, found that his public mandate further legitimized his ability to deal with 
council and outside organizations (Stoker, 2004). As Bebout (1955) found in his analysis of 
mayors in large American municipalities “the mayor, who will be directly accountable to the 
people…will be the chief policy maker.”  It is possible that council as a sign of “goodwill” 
would be more inclined to support a mayor’s initiatives because the mayor is perceived to enjoy 
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public support (Fenwick, Elcock and Lilley, 2003). There is a general acceptance that mayors are 
elected by a public that has goodwill intentions to see their new head of council do well in their 
post (Stoker, 2004).   
They would also help elevate a mayor’s presence and visibility with the general public 
and external stakeholders (Institute for Government, 2011). Elcock (1996) highlights how 
proponents of the elected-mayor system saw this actor as someone who could more effectively 
work with other regional government agencies and negotiate in the best interest of their 
municipality. Mayors would be well equipped to weigh in on issues of importance that are not 
directly linked to a mayor’s jurisdiction (Leach and Wilson, 2004). Bringing stakeholders 
together was highlighted as one of the many benefits of having a directly-elected mayor for 
London, according to the NLGN. Fenwick and Elcock (2005) interviewed mayors in the English 
system who had been elected and who reinforced the importance of building wider networks to 
execute on policy objectives and in forging closer relations with outside public and private 
organizations.  
The direct-elected mayor would also be far more effective at generating earned media 
attention, thereby having a larger public profile (Sweeting, 2002) and platform allowing them to 
be a more effective agenda setter and bring people together (National Local Government 
Network, 2006). Morgan and Watson (1992) echo this argument that direct election enhances the 
offices of the mayor with the general public and that mayors can exert greater influence in setting 
policy direction as a result. Leach and Wilson (2004) insist that mayors need to maintain contacts 
with media in order to successfully do their jobs as heads of council. A more engaged 
relationship with the media was also highlighted in a 2012 Durham Region staff report that 
examined how the Durham Chair position, and chair-council relations, would change were the 
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position to become directly-elected. It is rightly perceived that elected heads of council, and 
especially those who are more “media savvy”, can use their position with the media as a “bully 
pulpit” to shape policy (Wilkstrom, 1979). The NLGN insists that “Mayors are very well placed 
to play an effective advocacy role, whether they are raising the profile of their area in the 
corridors of power in Westminster, in the national media or on the international stage (New 
Local Government Network, 2010).” 
It was also believed that these mayors would be far more effective “public-facing 
champions” for their municipalities in helping to attract and retain economic development 
opportunities. It was believed that directly-elected mayors would be more effective at 
undertaking government relations advocacy efforts with the central government to broker deals 
in that municipality’s best interests (Sandford, 2013) and (Fenwick, Elcock and McMillan, 
2006). Stoker and Wolman (1992) write that “An elected mayor could speak on behalf of the 
community with much greater authority than could an appointed ceremonial mayor.” This last 
point will be further explored under Evaluation Theory 4.   
It was not only the Blair government that believed this but also the successor 
Conservative-led government by David Cameron, who was enamoured with local elected 
officials like former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg. A Conservative Party policy 
paper from 2009 spoke of the need to “give citizens in each of England’s twelve largest cities the 
chance of having an elected mayor. Big decisions should be made by those democratically 
accountable.” This is echoed by Orr (2004) who wrote that “Mayors have tended largely to be 
advocated on the basis that they would be the visible face of power and have the clout to get 
things done” (Orr, 2004). 
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Based on the abovementioned literature review about the merits of soft-power, survey 
questions were developed to generate feedback from the research participant groups to further 
understand whether or not a directly-elected regional chair would also enjoy soft powers. 
Participants were asked to comment on the following: council relations; upper and lower-tier 
dynamics; chair and bureaucratic staff relations; office budgets and political staff; 
intergovernmental affairs and relations with external organizations. 
2D - General Comments about Soft Powers: 
In their responses, municipal administrators were nearly unanimous that despite the fact 
that a directly-elected chair has authority from the public, in the end, they remain just one vote 
on council, and that municipal bureaucrats will respond to directives that only have a majority of 
council support despite perceptions of having soft powers. One administrator responded that “the 
election platform gives a chair a little bit of an edge to set policy” however, they also conceded 
that “in the end you need a mandate of council to execute on and not just the chair.” Another 
lower-tier CAO said that “one time my mayor came to my office to undertake an initiative and I 
responded by telling him that he needed to go back to council and get a majority of votes before 
we moved on it.” Another respondent said “direct election does not change the authority of the 
chair.” One CAO was far more pessimistic about the prospect of having a directly-elected chair, 
saying that “the chair cannot get too out of line with council even if they were directly-elected.” 
Another said that “if the elected chair sees them self as a higher authority this could worsen 
dynamics with the lower-tier municipalities.” 
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Elected officials were equally reserved or pessimistic about a chair emboldened with soft 
powers. One lower-tier mayor said “what if we end up with a Rob Ford type candidate elected?” 
These comments are consistent with previous concerns raised about the prospect and drawbacks 
of having an “outsider” elected to council. One lower-tier mayor said “someone could come in 
with a separate agenda from council”; that “council would become less cohesive”; and that 
although they acknowledged a chair would have a mandate from the public, in the end, “the chair 
is only as strong as their council.” To that point, another respondent said “having council on side 
is of the utmost importance to deliver quality local government services” and that “the results of 
council votes do not necessarily need to be unanimous but they have to be strong.”  
One regional councillor raised concerns about the “possibility of conflicting agendas 
between the chair and mayors (who serve at regional council) not aligning”, while another added 
to this point saying “council relations could change because the elected chair would be motivated 
to get their mandate out – I see it as a negative.” Another said that “with a directly-elected chair 
some lower-tier municipalities would be simply left out”. Another respondent said “if vote count 
was low in Niagara Falls, maybe that chair wouldn’t be as interested in the city and this could 
hinder upper and lower-tier relations.” There would be a disproportionate amount of time spent 
on certain municipalities over others. Another respondent said “the appointed chair is about 
garnering consensus as oppose to dictating issues”; while another lower-tier regional councillor 
added to this point saying “the chair helps to carry out our agenda with the appointment 
process.” 
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Current and former regional chairs did not hold the same pessimistic views as the other 
two research groups. Whereas lower-tier elected officials were concerned about parochialism, 
one regional chair respondent said “being directly elected has given me the opportunity to 
promote the vision of the region as a whole”; that “being directly elected has brought regional 
issues to the forefront” and that “regional issues are now a greater focus.” One chair who went 
from being appointed to directly-elected to the same position said “I now focus on promoting a 
regional vision versus stick handling local issues through regional council” and “that upon being 
directly elected, I certainly found that there were greater expectations for the regional agenda.” 
Another regional chair who went from being appointed to directly-elected echoed a 
similar sentiment insisting that “I can take more of a regional perspective toward addressing 
regional government issues because no mayor or regional councillor determines if I am elected.” 
This respondent added that with being appointed “there are too many IOUs and that the 
appointment process “doesn’t allow for strong leadership.” This individual much preferred the 
direct election process because “being elected can strengthen your hand” however, they also 
conceded that with no additional powers being granted to a directly-elected chair, they still need 
to have council onside to advance their policy priorities. 
Another regional chair who also served in their role as an appointed official was adamant 
that “even though I pushed for the chair’s position to be a directly-elected post, after being 
elected nothing changed to me about the way I did my job.” However, this respondent did note 
that relations with their colleagues on council did sour saying that “the mayors on regional 
council behaved differently” and that “they became nasty towards me and felt threatened by my 
presence on council.” Despite the animosity, this participant noted that “during the election 
campaign mayoral and council candidates’ paid close attention to what the chair ran on and how 
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the public was reacting to my election commitments.” Upon being elected, this respondent said 
that some of their campaign proposals easily became law because “council followed the train out 
of the station” and supported initiatives put forward by the elected chair and endorsed by the 
public. 
2E - Support Staff and Media Relations: 
For the chair/former chair research group, there was a general consensus that 
relationships did not change with the bureaucratic administrative staff. To this point, all research 
participants were asked whether or not they believed that the change to a directly-elected chair 
would require the chair’s office to have an increased budget and political staff to support the 
responsibilities being undertaken by the chair because it has now become a more public-facing 
position presumably with greater soft powers.  
Based on the literature, we would also assume that directly-elected chairs would have 
bigger support staff because they would want to exercise their soft powers by undertaking such 
things as greater media relations efforts to shape public opinion, influence council and to help 
achieve their policy initiatives. This theory was equally raised in a Durham Region staff report 
which suggested that “an elected Regional Chair may wish to undertake significantly more 
public events and public speaking than under the present system. This may require dedicated 
resources to manage events, prepare speaking notes, provide transportation and media relations.” 
As one regional chair said “I certainly get invited to a lot more events now that I am 
directly-elected” while another chair said “media have certainly taken greater interest since I 
became elected and I now do more interviews.” Interestingly, those chairs first appointed, and 
who then went on to become elected, showed very little interest to increase the size of their 
budgets after being elected.  
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One participant said “there was no increase in my staff size or my office budget and I had 
no interest to do so” whereas another individual said “council did increase my budget for the 
creation of one new position – a chief of staff – but I haven’t gotten around to hiring someone 
because I have better things to do.” Reservations to grow staff budgets might have to do with 
maintaining council relations. One elected officials showed contempt saying “oh yeah, the staff 
budget would have to increase for an elected chair’s office and I don’t know if that’s money well 
spent.” It is not always politically palatable to increase office budgets which might explain the 
reservations of some chairs’ to request more funding from council. 
Table 5 helps us better understand the realities of soft power. If we assume that directly-
elected officials have greater responsibilities because of their elected mandates, we would also 
assume that they would have more political support staff to undertake their responsibilities. 
However, there is no notable difference in the size of the staff between appointed and elected 
chairs. In a review of staff reports and other online sources, only the Chair of Niagara Region has 
listed a dedicated political support staff position of Director of Communication’s in the Chair’s 
Office. The mayor of the Greater London Authority has a political support staff of five, including 
a Mayoral Director responsible for communications.     
Table 6. Regional Chairs’ Offices6 
Regional 
Government 
Number of Employees  
(Full and Part-Time) 
Selection Method 
Durham 4 Elected 
Halton Unknown Elected 
Waterloo 3 Elected 
Niagara 3 Appointed 
Peel 4 Appointed 
York 3 Appointed 
 
                                                          
6 Peel Region Chair Staff Report, Budget 2016: http://www.peelregion.ca/council/agendas/2015archive.htm  
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 Another way to determine the exercising of soft powers is to compare and contrast the 
social media presence of regional chairs. Arguably, we would assume that the directly-elected 
heads of upper-tier regional governments would be more inclined to be active on social media 
outlets because it would allow them to communicate with the very public that elected them and 
promote their participation in public events. As Table 6 notes, with the exception of Chair 
Caslin, directly-elected chairs are more likely to have an active social media presence than their 
appointed counterparts. Chairs Emerson has no formal presence on social media. This 
information was compiled by doing a social media scan of different social media channels.  
Table 7. Regional Chairs’ Social Media Presence 
Regional 
Government 
Selection 
Method  
Facebook Twitter LinkedIn 
Roger Anderson, 
Durham 
Elected No Yes Yes 
Gary Carr, 
Halton 
Elected Yes Yes Yes 
Ken Seiling, 
Waterloo 
Elected Yes Yes No 
Alan Caslin, 
Niagara 
Appointed Yes Yes Yes 
Frank Dale, Peel Appointed No Yes No 
Wayne Emerson, 
York 
Appointed No No No 
 
2F - Government Relations and Stakeholder Relations: 
  
Another way to understand soft powers that apparently come from having a directly-
elected mandate was by asking participants about government and stakeholder relations 
engagement. On these topics, respondents were for the most part in agreement that changing the 
selection process would improve things. The Municipal Act also clearly states that the head of 
council serves as the principal spokesperson for their respective municipality. We asked 
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participants whether or not they believed that voice would be louder by changing the selection 
process and allowing for a directly-elected mandate?  
Over and above comments shared, they were in agreement that the personality of the 
chair has more to do with his or her success to undertake external relations, than the process 
which saw them become head of council. The importance of personality, in explaining the 
success of directly-elected mayors, was echoed in the literature review with case studies from the 
United States (Wilkstrom, 1979) and the GLA (Sweeting, 2002). The New Zealand 
government’s efforts to reform local government in Auckland also reiterated these points saying 
“plainly, the personal characteristics of individual leaders matter. Qualities such as vision, 
strength, stamina, energy, inventiveness, commitment, personal integrity, and charisma are 
associated with successful leadership (Auckland Governance Report Volume 1, 2009).” 
 Beginning first with elected officials, one lower-tier mayor said “whether it’s another 
government, a post-secondary institution or a Fortunate 500 company, these stakeholders have 
no interest or care on how the head of council was chosen. They are interested in one thing and 
that is: take me to your leader so that they can advance their own priorities and agendas.” 
Another lower-tier mayor added that “a chair’s effectiveness in dealing with other levels of 
government depends on how well they can carry the vote. Other levels of government will be 
less engaged about working with a municipality if they know the chair has no support from their 
council and will not be able to get things passed.” One regional councillor went back to the issue 
of party politics, noting that “since the race for chair would be so big, what would happen to our 
regional priorities if a card-carrying member of the Conservative Party gets elected but then has 
to go off and deal with Liberal governments at Queen’s Park and in Ottawa?”   
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 Responses from both former and current regional chairs, along with administrators, were 
mixed and slightly more positive at the prospect of dealing with other levels of government. One 
small-town CAO believed that “absolutely, the chair would be more effective at dealing with 
other levels of government” and that “the chair is not just there representing council but is 
present on behalf of the people.” Another administrator echoed this sentiment saying that “a 
chair would be more effective at dealing with other levels of government because they have that 
mandate derived from the people.” 
 Our regional chair respondents were more inclined to be optimistic about the changing 
relations. One chair who went from being appointed to directly-elected said that “the provincial 
government realized that there was no one person elected in an area that is also represented by 
half a dozen members of provincial parliament” and that “this had made the provincial 
government more aware.” One former regional chair said that after being directly-elected “I had 
more political parties take notice of me. I was approached by both major parties and encouraged 
to run for them during a provincial by-election.” However, another chair noted that “there should 
have been a greater difference because I share a common constituency with MPPs and MPs.”   
One way to further understand the soft powers of regional chairs is by reviewing their 
participation in external advocacy organizations. Whether elected or appointed, regional chairs 
are not invited to participate as members of the Large Urban Mayors’ Caucus of Ontario 
(LUMCO), a leading new regionalist intergovernmental relations organization, originally 
founded by former Mississauga mayor Hazel McCallion. Mayor McCallion is remembered for 
trying to have Mississauga separate from the Region of Peel.  
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Membership to this organization is open to any municipality with a population of more 
than 100,000 individuals. In the case of Niagara, the Chair does not get to participate in meetings 
even though he represents a constituency of nearly half-a-million people. However, the only 
Niagara presence is from the mayor of St. Catharines because his municipality’s population 
reaches the threshold for members. 
Another noteworthy example is the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) – a 
national advocacy organization that lobbies on behalf of all Canadian municipalities – and this 
organization’s Big City Mayors’ Caucus (BCMC). BCMC brings together the mayors of 
Canada’s largest municipalities from each province. Despite repeated attempts by some of 
Ontario’s regional chairs, namely Durham Chair Anderson, FCM has never agreed to let 
Ontario’s regional chairs participate in BCMC meetings even though Ontario’s regional upper-
tier governments represent a combined population of over four million people; a population 
larger than six Canadian provinces. Despite the efforts of directly-elected Chair Anderson, his 
soft powers did not make a difference and he faced resistance from Ontario BCMC members 
who did not want the chairs present, namely former Brampton Mayor Susan Fennell.     
Section 2G - Theory 4 - A Directly-Elected Chair Will Improve Economic Development 
Opportunities: 
The fourth evaluation theory explored builds on the previous research about the 
relationship elected heads of council have with external stakeholder organizations. In this case, it 
is about a head of council using their soft powers of “visibility” and legitimacy” to work with 
private companies and chambers of commerce to improve the economic development prospects 
by selling the attributes and merits of their jurisdictions (Warwick Commission, 2012). This soft 
power is articulated by Feiock (1987) who identifies: how local officials undertake different 
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types of economic development strategies and tactics including promotional and marketing 
activities and service coordination to strengthen their local economies. In their research on US 
mayors, Wolman and Spitzley (1996) note that:  
“a mayor is seen as a focal point for leading an economic development effort and for 
negotiating deals with development interests, a potential political entrepreneur able to 
step forward and create effective coalitions, and a provider leadership, a critical factor. 
When mayors are not directly elected and when they have few formal powers…they may 
not have the resources base to put together pro-growth coalitions.” 
 
A policy paper by the UK-based think tank New Local Government Network, found that 
English municipalities that chose to do away with the council-leader system in favour of a 
directly-elected head of council had a number of commonalities including economic decline 
(Randle, 2004).  This helps explain why Niagara Region was chosen as the case study for this 
research. Not only does Niagara Region handle economic development issues at the regional 
level (whereas Peel Region does not and defers to the lower-tier municipalities), Niagara 
continues to have an unemployment rate (7.6%) above the provincial average (7%) and national 
averages (7.1%), respectively. Wolman and Spitzley (1996) in there an analysis of elected 
mayors in the United States identify how mayors focus their attention on economic development 
when economic prospects weaken.   
The Greater Niagara Region Chamber of Commerce, for example, is a proponent of 
directly-electing the regional chair. In September 2015, the organization made a public 
deputation encouraging councillors to reform the system insisting that a directly-elected chair 
would better prioritize the Region’s needs to support the business community. The position taken 
by this Niagara Chamber is in line with Fenwick, Elcock and McMillan’s (2006) research that 
elected mayors are focal points for “businesses and other partners” and that these heads of 
council “endeavour to secure public involvement in policy development.” Wolman and Spitzley 
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(1996) argue that cities, like companies, have to compete with one another and this means having 
in place top-down leadership setting and driving economic development priorities.   
 The feelings expressed by the Greater Niagara Region Chamber are also common among 
other bodies as well. The UK-based Institute for Government Centre for Cities argues that “cities 
with strong and effective civic leadership that are well placed to make the most of local 
economic assets and compete better in a global economy. And mayors create an opportunity to 
have exactly this type of strong and effective leadership” (Institute for Government, 2011). Orr 
(2004) details another Blair government white paper that argued thriving local leadership is well 
positioned to “boost local economies.” The New Local Government Network (NLGN), another 
think tank group, was equally excited about the prospect of directly-elected mayors insisting that 
they would serve as ambassadors who could attract and retain foreign-direct investment. A 
growing role for mayors in international relations, described by Martins (2006) as the rise of 
“urban internalization”, is tied directly to a greater role with how economic development is 
handled (Leach and Wilson, 2004).   
These sentiments were echoed by the UK government white paper that said “the 
Government believes that elected mayors will bring a range of benefits to these cities including 
the ability to drive improvements in local city economies.” Former Deputy Prime Minister, John 
Prescott, who served as the lead-cabinet minister responsible for local government reforms stated 
the introduction of a mayor for London “is essential to preserve and enhance London’s 
competitiveness.”  
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Beyond the Blair government, the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government was equally supportive of the economic boost mayors could provide. Greg Clark, 
then the coalition government’s cities minister suggested that: “The great challenge before us is 
one of economic growth, and I’m convinced that the battle for Britain’s prosperity will be won or 
lost in Britain’s cities…the world’s great cities have mayors that lead their city on the 
international stage, attracting investment and jobs” (Warwick Commission, 2012).  
George Osborne, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) laid out in a 
speech the Cameron government’s plans to transform the northern English municipalities with 
the creation of the new Greater Manchester Municipal authority as a “northern economic 
powerhouse” that will be “with the accountability and leadership that an elected city-wide mayor 
will provide7.” 
Section 2H - Research Participant Responses about Economic Development: 
 As was the case with the three other research evaluation questions, participants 
simply did not buy into the theories presented by the Blair government, supportive think tanks 
and the other literature reviewed. Current and former regional chairs were the most telling. One 
regional chair said “mayors kept me out of participating in international trade missions because 
they were threatened” and that “as a result my role in economic development remained the same 
from when I was appointed.” It should be noted that members of the Greater London Authority 
do not serve both at the lower-tier and upper-tier; they are only members of the GLA. This might 
help explain why there appears to be a lack of resistance on the part of lower-tier London 
boroughs from objecting to the Mayor of London’s participation in international affairs and 
                                                          
7 HM Treasury, 14 May 2005, Speech: Chancellor on building a Northern Powerhouse: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-on-building-a-northern-powerhouse  
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global economic development. As previously noted the Mayor of London has a dedicated staffer 
responsible for handling international affairs.   
Another regional chair said that “the area municipalities blocked creation of a regional 
economic development corporation” and that “I guess it’s because my mayors like to travel”; 
adding that this was a set back because “as a directly-elected regional chair I come to the job 
with an agenda I ran on and job creation continues to be an ongoing priority for my residents.” 
On the issue of international trade missions, this respondent said “I haven’t done any” and “I 
believe these trade mission are more show than substance.” Another regional chair said “the 
economic development process was effective before we moved to direct election” and that “the 
selection process made no difference because chambers and businesses know which government 
they have to deal with.” 
 When asked about the merits of a directly-elected head of council improving the 
prospects of local economic development, one Niagara-area lower-tier mayor said “that notion is 
simply pie in the sky”. This participant found this rationale to be “baseless” adding that “it has to 
do with the personality of the chair, and most importantly, having a council that is working 
together toward achieving economic development goals.” The importance of personality was 
also echoed by one regional councillor who said “on economic development a lot of it is 
personality and the chair is only as strong as their council.  
Another lower-tier mayor returned to the theme of outsider interference that would 
emerge from the campaign for electing a regional chair saying “when it comes to economic 
development, being directly elected would be a detriment as the chair could be financed by 
businesses with business interests.” Concerns surrounding parochialism re-emerged with this 
participant adding that direct election would actually produce a chair who “did not look at 
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regional issues” and that “a campaign where a chair relies more on one area over the other for 
voters, could produce lopsided government – pandering to one community over another.” 
Similar sentiments were also shared by municipal administrators. One CAO reiterated the 
importance of personality to get results adding that “whether you are directly elected or 
appointed the regional chair is the conduit on economic development.” Another administrator 
emphasized that “ultimately it wouldn’t matter about the chair because what matters most is the 
level of service provided by economic development staff. Staff are the ones with the expert 
knowledge to work with businesses.” However, this same participant identified the importance of 
“elected official serving as boosters and promotes for the region.” 
In 2015 it was announced that the Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance, a new regionalist 
body dedicated to attracting and retaining foreign-direct investment throughout the Greater 
Toronto Area, would be transformed into a renewed economic development body known as 
Global Toronto. To help manage and oversee the transition and establishment of this new entity 
an Interim Board of Directors was created consisting of private-sector representatives and local 
government representatives. Not one regional chair serves on the Interim Board of Directors. 
Based on the literature review we could assume that Durham Chair Anderson would be more 
likely to have been appointed because of his direct-election and the number of lower-tier 
municipalities he represents but this is not the case. Rather, Pickering Mayor David Ryan is the 
representative for Durham Region and the Eastern Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Mississauga 
Mayor Bonnie Crombie represents the Western GTA and not directly-elected Halton Region 
Chair Gary Carr.     
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Section 3A - Should the Niagara Region Chair Be Directly Elected? No. Concluding 
Analysis and Research Criticisms:     
 
Table 8 is captures the overall responses of the three research groups based on their 
feedback to the four separate evaluation theories. Based on the research and evidence presented 
here, the Niagara Region Chair should not be directly-elected and the appointment process 
should remain the same. Over and above everything that was shared, the respondents disagreed 
with the arguments brought forward in the literature review. 
Table 8. Overall Research Responses (Select Responses) 
 
Evaluation Theories Municipal 
Administrators 
Niagara Regional 
Councillors 
Current/Former 
Regional Chairs 
 
Voter Turnout “The campaign for a 
directly elected chair 
position would not 
increase voter turnout.” 
“No.” “Voter turnout did not 
change.” 
Calibre of Candidates “Party politics would 
creep into our local 
government system and 
that can be dangerous 
when voting in blocs.” 
“A campaign for 
directly-elected chair 
would make it harder 
for candidates from 
smaller municipalities 
to compete for these 
communities to be 
represented.” 
 
 
 
“I had an opponent 
with unlimited 
money.” 
Soft Powers “An elected regional 
chair could see 
themselves as a 
superpower, when 
instead, the regional 
chair needs to be a 
leader among peers.” 
“The way a regional 
chair manages 
agendas and governs 
has to do with the 
personality of the 
chair. The current 
appointment system 
has worked quite 
effectively.” 
 
 
 
 
“The selection process 
made no difference as 
to whether or not I 
was more effective at 
my job.” 
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Economic Development “I don’t think direct 
election will make a 
difference. Economic 
Development staff has 
the expert knowledge, 
whereas elected officials 
should be the boosters 
and promoters.” 
“That’s pie in the sky; 
it seems like a 
baseless notion.” 
“My role in economic 
development 
remained the same 
after I went from 
being appointed chair, 
to being directly-
elected to the 
position.”  
 
Section 3B - Voter Turnout: 
 
On the issue of voter turnout and public engagement there was a consensus by all three 
respondent groups that voter turnout and public engagement would not increase as a result of 
introducing a region-wide campaign for Niagara. As one regional councillor said “we do not 
elect a prime minister or premier so how can we say the current regional chair process is 
undemocratic?” There were concerns that only lower-tier municipalities that supported a 
candidate for chair would receive preferential treatment from the chair. This would undermine 
doing what is in the best interest of Niagara Region as a whole. The voter turnout argument is 
further undermined when we compare and contrast results between upper and lower-tier 
municipalities from the previous two Ontario municipal elections. As Table 3 shows, voter 
turnout actually went down for Durham Region in 2014, when the first direct-election for 
regional chair took place. 
Section 3C - Calibre of Candidates: 
 This brings me to our second point: calibre of candidates. In 2014, Durham Chair 
Anderson went from being appointed to directly-elected. In 1997, Waterloo Chair Ken Seiling 
went from being appointed to directly elected, as did former Halton Region Chair, Joyce 
Savolaine, in 2000. These three examples further undermine the Blair government’s beliefs that 
outsiders from the private-sector would be attracted to run for these new elected mayoral 
positions once created. Incumbent “career politicians” continued to dominate local government.  
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Ironically, the notion of an outsider becoming chair was seen as a detriment. Respondents 
raised serious concerns about “outsiders” being elected and how conflicting agendas of council 
and the chair could undermine the business of regional government. Issues of conflicting agendas 
and poor relations with council and corporate staff were raised as possible drawbacks of having 
elected outsiders “in control” of council business. The timing of this research study also 
undermined the calibre of candidate theory. The ongoing drama of the Donald Trump 
presidential campaign played out parallel to when these interviews were taking place. One 
wonders how respondents would have reacted to these particular questions had there been no 
Trump factor present?   
There were repeated concerns raised that because of the sheer size of Niagara Region, a 
“party creep” could emerge into local government because of how difficult it would be to run a 
campaign for regional chair. Respondents generally believed party candidates or wealthy 
businesspeople would be the only ones capable of undertaking, competing and winning an 
election campaign of this size and scope. As Table 5 notes, these sentiments are entirely 
justifiable. Six out of the ten largest municipalities in Canada are currently lead by a head of 
council who held previous partisan elected office either provincially or federally. The largest city 
in Atlantic Canada, Halifax, is led by Mayor Mike Savage, a former Liberal Party MP.  
 Local government in British politics has partisan involvement. It is understandable that 
the Blair and Cameron governments would not have raised concerns about this in their 
government whitepapers about pushing for directly-elected heads of council. The parallels 
between local government in England and Ontario are not identical and this was always a 
drawback when undertaking this study.  
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What is very interesting is the lack of concerns raised by these British governments over 
the issue of parochialism. The Greater London Authority shares powers and preside over 32 
different London boroughs. Borough populations range from 150,000 to 300,000. The 
government seemed to overlook entirely concerns about the emergence of parochialism as a 
result of mayoral campaigns. This was not the case for research respondents. It should be noted 
that populations in Niagara Region vary significantly more than they do in the Greater London 
Authority, which helps us better understand the consistency of concerns raised about smaller 
communities being placed at a disadvantage. Wainfleet is the smallest municipality with a 
population of 6,356, whereas St. Catharines is the largest municipality with a population 
131,400. As Table 4 notes, smaller municipalities have been well served by the existing 
appointment process. The threat of parochialism could undermine relations between the region 
and the 12 lower-tier municipalities.  
One of the quirks of the Niagara Region appointment process, unlike other Ontario 
regional governments, is that only candidates who have been elected to regional council can put 
their names forward to stand for regional chair. When interviewing regional councillors it is not 
entirely surprising that they would be resistant to changing the very system that could see them 
get elected to the position of chair at some point in their careers. 
Section 3D - Soft Powers: 
 In response to the issue of soft powers there was a consensus among all research 
participant groups that the effectiveness of a regional chair has more to do with the occupant’s 
personality and approach to the job. As one regional councillor said “the success of our chair 
comes down to the function of the person.” Empowered chairs were those who could build 
consensus, networks and coalitions and effectively steer initiatives through Council with the goal 
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of supporting the entire region. It should be noted however that two of the regional chairs 
interviewed, who had both gone from being appointed to directly-elected, did highlight how the 
region-wide campaign led them to take more of a region-wide approach to setting policies.  
We can assume that because of the mandate derived from the public a directly-elected 
chair would need more staff, like a dedicated communications professional, to build networks 
with the media to help agenda set. Furthermore, Table 7 demonstrates that there is no 
discrepancy between using social media channels. Again, based on the ideas of soft power, we 
could assume that elected chairs would be more outward looking in their communications 
efforts. Only Halton Chair Carr (elected) and Niagara Chair Caslin (appointed) used all of the 
three social media channels presented.  
 On the issue of building relations with external stakeholders and other levels of 
government, respondents were again generally dismissive of the idea that being directly-elected 
would make a difference. There were repeated comments that the personality of the chair is what 
matters and that stakeholders, whether governments, public or private-sector organizations, were 
astute enough to know how to engage the region about their own issues and concerns. 
Section 3E - Economic Development: 
 This brings us to economic development. Generally, the idea that a directly-elected head 
of council was better positioned to help foster an environment of greater economic prosperity 
was outright dismissed. What is most interesting is how previous and sitting regional chairs ran 
into resentment from their regional council colleagues over this file. One regional chair said that 
regional council blocked a proposal to create a regional economic development agency, whereas 
another chair said they had been blocked by the lower-tier mayors from participating 
international trade missions.  
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One way to further clarify and understand the value of directly-elected heads of council 
participating in local economic development initiatives is by interviewing economic 
development office staff for their ideas and opinions. Department staff may be more inclined to 
speak about the merit of having heads of council be more hands on, especially in the realm of 
building relations with international governments and businesses. French President Francois 
Hollande welcomed Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre to the Élysée Palace in Paris. Vancouver 
Mayor Gregor Robertson travelled to the Vatican for a climate change conference, hosted by 
Pope Francis. During her first year in office Mississauga Mayor Bonnie Crombie has participated 
in investment missions to South America, Portugal, India and Japan. The City of Brampton has a 
comprehensive International Marketing Strategy which details the dates and destination of places 
the mayor is to travel to help attract and retain foreign-direct investment. Clearly something must 
be working. However, this paper failed to capture and articulate what exactly that is. 
Section 3F - Final Thoughts – Governance Structures: 
Even though the Blair and Cameron governments were enamoured with American 
municipal leaders like Chicago’s Richard Daley or New York’s Michael Bloomberg, when 
introducing the mayor system to English municipalities, neither government chose to empower 
mayors with the authority of their American counterparts. The Mayor of London has no veto 
authority unlike many of their American counterparts. In fact, the council-manager model was 
one of the recommendations championed by the Blair government when first introducing its 
reforms. The council-manager model, unlike the mayor-council (strong mayor) system, found in 
places like Chicago, might help explain why British voters ultimately did not accept the Blair 
government’s reform proposals the way the government had hoped, further noted in Table 2.   
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These sentiments were echoed by research participants. One regional councillor said “I 
would be in favour of a directly-elected chair if they were empowered with executive powers.” 
One lower-tier mayor said “why change the system when the chair is only allowed to vote when 
there is a tie?” One CAO said that “we cannot talk about the chair selection process without 
having a bigger discussion about governance including reducing the number of regional 
councillors or even studying regional amalgamation.”  
It is worth exploring whether or not regional governments have matured enough, since 
their formation, to have developed an identity of their own. The mandate of regional government 
was to help with coordinating planning efforts. It was a top-down approach brought about by the 
provincial government. 
Based on the feedback shared in this research undertaking, the opening quote in the 
introduction of this paper that “An elected politician has political authority which an appointed 
official, no matter how powerful, lacks” (Howard and Sweeting, 2007), simply does not hold 
true. To reiterate what one Niagara Regional Councillor said “the risk of changing the system is 
not worth the reward.”   
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